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state habeas proceedings in the trial court and on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. The right to counsel at federal habeas proceedings is
statutory. 26 Additionally, although the right to counsel does exist at most
stages of capital litigation, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel does not. That right applies only at trial and on
direct appeal, where its basis is constitutional. It does not apply to state
or federal habeas corpus proceedings. 27
There is no statutory time limit in Virginia to file state or federal
habeas proceedings. However, the Commonwealth often petitions
courts to set execution dates when it feels the defense is delaying the
filing of a state habeas corpus petition too long. After such action, or in
lieu of it, the Commonwealth and the defense will usually agree on when
the defendant must file the petition. Regarding federal petitions, Justice
Blackmun noted for the majority in McFarlandthat federal courts could

exercise their discretion against granting stays if a "dilatory" capital
defendant squandered the time available to obtain counsel to prepare the
28
habeas corpus petition.
Unlike Texas, Virginia generally does not seek oppressively
quick execution dates for capital defendants. But attorneys for capital
defendants should take fullest advantage of the time before state habeas
proceedings must be instituted to reinvestigate their case. It is also
important that defense counsel agree on a deadline for filing a federal
habeas petition, so that counsel will have as much time as possible to
investigate important issues for appeal. Examples include withholding
of exculpatory evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
29
which require investigation outside the trial record.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig

26 28 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2254, 2255 (1988).
27 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,752-53 (1991). See case
summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. l,p. 4 (1991).

28 McFarlandv. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2573.
29 See Hobart, State Habeas in Virginia:A Critical Transition,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 23 (1990).

ROMANO v. OKLAHOMA
114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On the morning of July 19, 1986, John Joseph Romano and David
Wayne Woodruff brutally murdered and robbed Romano's friend and
former gambling boss Lloyd Thompson. 1 Tried as co-defendants,
Romano and Woodruff were convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. They immediately appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals requesting relief on the basis of irreconcilable defenses. 2 While
this appeal was pending, Romano stood trial for a separate and earlier
capital murder charge arising out of events in October 1985.
On October 16, 1985, Roger Sarfaty was found murdered and
robbed in his apartment. 3 The State sought the death penalty against
Romano, charging murder in the first degree and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Romano was convicted. During the sentencing phase of the
trial, the State sought to prove four aggravating circumstances including
that the defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony and
would constitute a continuing threat to society. In an attempt to prove the
past and future dangerousness of defendant, the State introduced, over
the objections of the defense, a copy of the judgment and sentence from
the Thompson murder conviction. The document revealed that the
defendant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
It also showed that defendant intended to appeal the outcome.

The jury found the existence of all four aggravating circumstances
and recommended death for the murder conviction and one thousand
years imprisonment for the robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced
accordingly and Romano appealed. 4 While the appeal in this case was
pending, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma overturned the
conviction for the Thompson murder, holding that Romano's trial should
have been severed from that ofWoodruff. The Thompson judgment was
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 5
Given this sequence of events, Romano argued on his Sarfaty
appeal that the trial court erred when it admitted the documentation ofthe
Thompson conviction and sentence. Romano asserted it was improper
to admit the conviction because it was not final at the time of admission
and had since been overturned. Furthermore, he argued, the sentence
impermissibly reduced the jury's sense of responsibility for its decision
under the Eighth Amendment and rendered the sentencing determination
so unreliable as to amount to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
6
Amendment.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding
that although theevidence oftheThompson sentencewas irrelevant, the

1 Woodruff v. State, 825 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
2 Id. at 274.
3 Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
4 Id.
5 Romano v. State, 827 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992)

(Romano was tried a second time for the 1985 Thompson murder and was
again found guilty of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to
death.).
6 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004,2007 (1994).
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jury was properly instructed on how to proceed in its deliberations.
Accordingly, it could not be said that the sentencing deliberations were
undermined in any way. Romano sought and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide the question of whether "admission of
evidence that a capital defendant already has been sentenced to death in
another case impermissibly undermine[s] the sentencing jury's sense of
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's
7
death, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
HOLDING
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that admission of
evidence regarding Romano's prior death sentence did not undermine
of
the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness
8
the death penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Eighth Amendment Inquiry
The Eighth Amendment's concern that the death penalty not be
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed requires states to ensure "that
9
capital sentencing decisions rest on [an] individualized inquiry." This
of
the
individual
inquiry must encompass the "character and record
10
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense." In meeting
this end, under the Oklahoma scheme a sentencing jury may not impose
death unless it unanimously finds the existence of at least one statutory
aggmvator beyond a reasonable doubt and that any aggravating circum11
stances outweigh any evidence in mitigation presented by the defense.
A capital defendant's constitutional entitlement to an individualized inquiry regarding the appropriateness of death is impermissibly
jeopardized if the sentencing jury is led to feel less responsible than it
13
should for its decision. 12 Relying on Caldwellv. Mississippi, Romano
contended that the introduction of the Thompson death sentence adversely affected the jury's sense of responsibility for deciding his fate. In
Caldwel114 the Court held that the jury must not be misled regarding the
role it plays in the capital sentencing decision for to do so would
15
undermine the defendant's right to an individualized sentencing.

7 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 380 (1993).
8 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S.Ct. at 2008-09.
9 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987).
10 Id. (citing Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
11Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1981).
12 Darden v. Wainwright,477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986).
13 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
14 InCaldwell v. Mississippi,472 U.S. 320 (1985), the inaccurate
and misleading statements of the prosecutor, agreed to by the judge, were
found by the U.S. Supreme Court to have minimized the jury's sense of
responsibility formakingadetermination of the appropriateness of death
and the death sentence was commuted.
15 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336.
16 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor emphasizes that the
introduction of the Thompson sentence could have risen to the level of
a Caldwellviolation if it had been both inaccurate at the time of offering
and had undermined the jury's sentencing responsibility.
17 The dissent emphasized the distinction between evidence and
argument. In Caldwell, improper prosecutorial closing argument was
deemed to have impermissibly undermined the jury's sense ofresponsibility for its sentencing decision. The prosecutor stated that the returned

The majority read Caldwell to apply only if the jury had been
"affirmatively misled." According to the Court, since the Thompson
sentence was not false when held out for the Sarfaty jury's consideration,
this evidence was not an affirmative distortion and therefore did not
contravene the principle established in Caldwell.16 This narrow interpretation of Caldwell altogether failed to explain how verbal directives
from the prosecutor to thejury were impermissibly misleading, while the
introduction ofevidence of a prior death sentence was deemed harmless
error unless the defendant proved otherwise. It is settled law that
argument is not evidence and is therefore not to carry the same force as
evidence. 17 Juries are to decide cases on the evidence and the law as they
hear it from the trial judge. 18 It is thus extremely difficult to reconcile
the findings of Caldwell and Romano. The former decision held that
improper prosecutorial communications with the jury undermined the
defendant's constitutional right to a reliable sentencing while the latter
found that the integrity of the jury's deliberations was not compromised
by the introduction into evidence of a prior condemnation to death.
Romano also argued that admission of the Thompson judgment
violated the Eighth Amendment because it was irrelevant to the determination of the instant offense. Despite the fact that the aggravating
evidence was ultimately deemed irrelevant as a matter of Oklahoma
law, 19 the majority held that its admission did not constitute federal
constitutional error and dismissed the claim. Yet, this position seems to
be at odds with prior precedent in which the court has held that "it would
be error for a State to attach the 'aggravating' label to, or otherwise
authorize the jury to draw adverse inferences from factors that are ...
totally irrelevant to the sentencing process .... 20
II. Fourteenth Amendment Inquiry
Romano also claimed that admission of the Thompson sentence
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process protection
against fundamental unfairness. The majority found that the admission
of the evidence did not so infect the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due
process. 21 This finding rested on two underlying presumptions: first,
that the jurors followed the trial court's proper instructions and second,
that the instructions sufficiently impressed upon the jury the importance

verdict would automatically be subjected to appellate review. In Romano, evidence of defendant's earlier condemnation to death was presented
to the jury which could have diminished thejury's sense ofresponsibility
for its life-or-death deliberations. Caldwell was reversed on the basis of
the unknown but potentially impermissible effects of argument on the
jury. The decision in Romano was affirmed despite the grave risk that the
evidence presented could have convinced the jury that Romano's fate
had been sealed by the previous jury. See generally 1 Charles E. Friend,
The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 1-4 (4th ed. 1993).
18 See, e.g., 1 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia,
§ 1-5 (4th ed. 1993).
19 Romano v. State, 847 P.2d at 391 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that Romano's first death sentence was irrelevant to
determining the instant offense).
20 Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2640 (1994).
21 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,416 U.S. 637 (1974) (setting
forth the proper analytical framework in which to evaluate Romano's
claim; the due process protection test is whether the evidence so infected
the proceedings as to render the resulting conviction constitutionally
unfair).
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the jurors followed the trial court's proper instructions and second, that
the instructions sufficiently impressed upon thejury the importance ofits
role. Accordingly, the majority reasoned that the evidence should have
had little to no effect on the jury's deliberations. 22 By refusing to address
the potential effects of the Thompson death sentence on the jury, the
majority effectively shifted to Romano the burden of proving that this
evidence infected the jury's deliberations to an unconstitutional degree. 23 Although a subtie shift, the results were nevertheless damning to
the defendant while according a windfall to the state. 24 In Caldwell the
Court overturned a capital sentence as unreliable because of the unknown
impact of a prosecutor's closing statements on the jury's sense of
responsibility. Unable to say whether or not the evidence influenced the
jury inRomano,the majority refused to engage the issue any further and
upheld the conviction thereby signaling satisfaction with the reliability
of the jury's discharge of its duties.
Although Romano has no direct impact on Virginia practice, it does
illustrate the effects of state evidentiary rules on capital deliberations.
Not only does the decision call into question the amount of attention paid
by the Court to these effects, but it also casts doubt upon the court's
commitment to the reliability ofcapital jury determinations. Admittedly,

the Eighth Amendment does not establish a federal code of evidence to
25
supersede state evidence rules in capital sentencing proceedings;
26
however, the Court's stance in -Green v. Georgia implies that state
evidentiary rules must sometimes give way in capital sentencing proceedings. 27 It is unclear whether Romano signals a trend toward
increased deference to states in this area at the expense of reliability.
Romano demonstrates the importance of making every effort to
prevent the admission of irrelevant evidence into capital sentencing
proceedings. Even though a defendant's prior capital conviction may be
relevant to issues of past and future dangerousness, evidence of the
imposition of the death penalty by one jury is irrelevant to the capital
sentencing determinations of another jury. It is therefore critical for
defense attorneys to attempt to block admission of such evidence through
motions in limine and timely objections. It is true that Romano eventually lost his claim five to four in the United States Supreme Court.
However, had the claim been defaulted, as are so many constitutional
claims in Virginia, it would never have received federal review.

22 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. at 2012. Interestingly, in
arriving at this conclusion, the court altogether ignored the fact that the
instructions explicitly limited the jury's consideration to the four
aggravators Oklahoma sought to prove and that the Thompson sentence
was the sole support for the past dangerousness aggravator.
23 Id. at 2016. In dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out that
Caldwell did not require Romano to prove the prosecutor's belief that
introduction of the death sentence would incline the jury towards death.
24 Compare with Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
Romano approved the state's use of a conviction and sentence that were
accurate at the time of trial. The later reversal of the conviction and
sentence was not held to render their use a "windfall" for the state. In
contrast, defense counsel's failure in Lockhart to cite to the sentencing

court a case, valid at that time, that would have prevented his client from
being sentenced to death constituted ineffective assistance. However,
since the case was later reversed, the United States Supreme Court found
Fretwell did not suffer any prejudice at the hands of his counsel and to
therefore allow his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed
would amount to a "windfall."
25 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. at 2011.
26 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
27
Id. (holding that the exclusion oftestimonial evidence suggesting
co-defendant was the triggerman was grounds for reversal even though
the evidence violated the hearsay rule provided by Georgia's rules of
evidence).

Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber

TURNER v. WILLIAMS
35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the morning of July 12, 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner, armed with
a shotgun, entered ajewelry store owned and operated by W. Jack Smith,
Jr. In the course of robbing the store, Turner, without any provocation,
shot Smith in the head. After a police officer had attempted to negotiate
with him, Turner returned to Smith and fired two close-range shots into
the left side of Smith's chest. Although Smith had survived the initial
wound, these second shots were fatal. 1

Turner was convicted and sentenced to death2 and the Virginia
Supreme Court, on direct appeal, affirmed. 3 Turner then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in Virginia, which was denied. 4 Turner next
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District
5
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was also denied.
Turner was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, which

I Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 876-877 (4th Cir. 1994).
2 Id. at 877.
3 Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).

4 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 877. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed and the United States Supreme Court again denied
certiorari. Turnerv. Morris,462 U.S. 1112 (1983).
5 Turnerv. Williams, 35 F.3d at 877. This was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Turnerv. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985).

